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Food Crisis and the Structure of Trade 
          
Jacques Hersh and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt 
 
 
“Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral.”  
Bertold Brecht, Dreigroschenoper1 
 
 
Situating the problem: Food for Thought 
When Francis Fukuyama published his essay ”The End of History” at the time 
of  the breaking-up of the Soviet Empire and the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
dominating ideological discourse was that  liberal capitalism would now have a 
free hand  to resolve humanity’s problems without having to face  opposition  
from political forces. The mood of optimism encapsulated in neoliberalism 
became overwhelming in the 1990s.  British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher 
going as far as to coin the phrase “There is no alternative,” or “TINA” for short. 
 
The implication of the new mantra was that notions of malfunctioning and 
disharmony in the global capitalist system now belonged to the dustbin of 
history. Markets were again considered to be self-regulating and best left out of 
political control. Forgotten from the collective memory was that such a project 
had in fact been carried out in the period between the two world wars. The 
attempt to decouple the economy from society was analyzed as being utopian by 
Karl Polanyi (1944/1957) and bound to result in disaster. According to his 
thinking, this in turn would bring back the “double movement” of state 
interventionism with the aim of protecting society from world market forces.   
 
The decades of neoliberalism brought ravage to the social sectors of leading 
regulatory capitalist states, former state socialist countries, capitalist 
developmental states and nationalist states in the so-called Third World. The 
period has been marked by concentration of wealth and internal polarization at 
the national level as well as between countries in the international system. In 
essence however, the implementation of a global neoliberal economic strategy 
represented the attempt to surmount the tendency of overproduction tied to the 
former state-led productivistic model. The experiment with the market-driven 
model of capital accumulation, based more on financial speculation in the 
“fictive” economy than productive endeavours in the real economy, was 
intended to resolve the difficulties encountered by the state-led economic model. 
                                                          
1  “First the grub, then the morality”. 
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Accompanying the hegemony of finance was the search, on the part of industrial 
capital, for more profitable sites of production. Outsourcing production to lower 
cost areas (China is a case in point) permitted a catching-up process based on 
uneven development characterized by  the relative deindustrialization of the 
United States economy in relation to China and other potential emerging 
powers. The trade imbalances created by the export-orientation of new 
economic giants, like China, and the market of last resort, the United States, was 
untenable in the longer run. The American current account deficits gave rise to a 
huge foreign debt while the emerging economies accumulated more and more 
dollar reserves. The military expenditures and the costly wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan created the financial problem of the United States which was 
furthermore accentuated by the rise of commodity prices partly because of the 
increased demand of emerging economies for oil and other commodities such as 
food. This increase was also generated by speculation on the commodity 
exchange markets and when the financial bubble bust, in conjunction with the 
financial meltdown, prices for oil and agricultural products tumbled. 
 
In the conventional interpretation, the turmoil which is presently affecting the 
world economy is presented mainly as the result of the malfunctioning of the 
U.S. financial sector, i.e. the housing bubble. However as touched upon above, 
the current economic recession --which is starting to remind us of the depression 
of the 1930s-- is a structural and multifaceted crisis of world capitalism. With 
regard to the thesis of the “end of history” and “TINA”, the current economic 
turbulence points to the deconstruction of the ideological hegemony of 
neoliberalism. Not only do we see the reappearance of poverty in advanced 
capitalist societies and hunger in different parts of the Third World, but also the 
gestation of resistance and social mobilization. The seeds of the “second 
movement” are germinating most prominently on the continent of South 
America where leftist and proto-socialist forces have come to power through 
democratic electoral processes.  In other words, the process we may be 
witnessing is “the return of/to history.” Looking ahead, the signs are that the 
script will most likely be based on a back to the future scenario! The societal 
evolution of the capitalist formations worldwide will probably involve the 
recurrence of social conflicts confirming the Marxian axiom that: “The history 
of all hitherto existing history is the history of class struggles.”2 (Marx and 
Engels (1888) 1958:34). 
 
 
                                                          
2   Engels in a note to the English edition of 1888, added the qualification of written history 
in order to take into account that humans had in previous social organizations lived in 
classless primitive forms of communistic societies. 
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Chronic hunger: A man-made scourge 
The second “post-end of history” reality check is the re-emergence of the age-
long fight for survival. Throughout the ages, human existence was tied to the 
ability of obtaining the necessary nourishment for sustaining life. This expressed 
itself in a give and take relationship with nature as well as social relations which 
affected the way the food supply was produced and distributed. In the very 
beginning of his opus magnum   The Geopolitics of Hunger, Josué de Castro 
made a point which can be still be applied as the leitmotiv for the  persistent  
plague of hunger, famine and under/over nourishment which is affecting a large 
number of people in the modern world:  
 
The history of man from the beginning has been the history of his struggle for 
his daily bread. It is very difficult to understand how this pretentiously 
superior animal, this lord and master of the universe who has won so many 
battles against the forces of nature, should have failed to obtain a decisive 
victory in his struggle for subsistence. (Castro (1952) 1977: 49)  
 
The evidence presented by Josué de Castro as well as more recent empirical 
material (Young 1997) show that the curse of chronic hunger is more likely to 
be  man-made than the result of natural calamities. In most cases the hunger 
phenomenon and underdevelopment, as demonstrated by the former director of 
FAO, was related to the legacy of colonialism which included economic 
exploitation and political oppression. With the emancipation of the colonies and 
their incorporation into the world economy as national entities, the “extra-
economic” means of surplus extraction were replaced by market mechanisms 
and trading relations. This type of market-led unequal exchange had previously 
existed in the pattern of trade relations that had been established between Latin 
American producers of raw materials and foodstuffs and industrial exporters 
from the core nations. 
 
 
The capitalist mode of food production - a framework 
The interpretation of the modern problem of production and distribution of food 
on a world scale necessitates a frame of reference specifying the object and level 
of analysis as well as the tools of analysis. Our point of departure is that the key 
to understanding the genesis and mode of functioning of capitalism lies in the 
basic role of agriculture. Although not in contradiction to the more conventional 
conceptualization of capitalism it does represent a shift of emphasis. The 
industrial revolution and the establishment of a world division of labour through 
the expansion of the capitalist mode of production to all continents gave rise to a 
tendency of considering agriculture as having been replaced by industrialism 
and therefore belonging to the realm of political-economic history. In effect, the 
political economic perspective is useful in understanding the transformation that 
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took place in landed society and its primordial importance to the origin and 
evolution of capitalism. However, in order to understand the functioning of the 
internationalization of capital accumulation and the contemporary 
industrialization of food production by agribusiness, political-economic history 
needs to be supplemented with (international) political economy. Thus in 
contrast to the more individualized perspective on entitlement and access offered 
by Sen (1981) we suggest that by bringing agriculture back into the analysis, the 
genesis and modus operandi of capitalism as a social system becomes more 
inclusive.3 Indeed as put by Ernest Mandel, awareness of the transformations 
that have taken place in food production are primordial for the conceptualization 
of the later evolution of the world capitalist system: “The development of 
agriculture lays the foundation for a real division of labour, the separation of 
town from country, and for generalising exchange-relations.” (Mandel 1968: 
271) 
 
 
The agrarian question and the genesis of industrial capitalism 
The long held opinion in the West associating the rise of capitalism with cities 
and by implication the activities of trade and commerce is being challenged by 
the approach which gives priority to the social transformation in the countryside. 
According to this economic history perspective, the emphasis should be put on 
the changes of relationships in the agrarian economy which involved the 
dispossession of rural producers from their land and forced them onto the labour 
market for their subsistence; in addition the fact that farming activity became 
based on the production of agricultural commodities for profit on the market 
should also be given due consideration. Viewed in this manner, the resulting 
structure of agrarian capitalism is seen as having introduced the essential 
elements of modern capitalism. (McNally 1990: xii) As pointed out by Wood, 
this socio-economic arrangement was fundamentally different from what existed 
in other precapitalist societies. In the capitalist formation, the particular property 
relations between producers and appropriators were determinant and gave it its 
specificity: “Only in capitalism is the dominant mode of surplus appropriation 
based on the dispossession of the direct producers, whose surplus labour is 
appropriated by purely ‘economic’ means.” (Wood 2000:25) Regardless of the 
impressive role of the market in capitalist societies, as the main determinant and 
regulator of social reproduction, its emergence “presupposed its penetration into 
the production of life’s most basic necessity, food.” (Wood ibid.) 
                                                          
3   In their introduction to the volume Hungry for Profit, the editors point out the 
significance of bringing agriculture back in the analysis of the capitalist world system: 
“The purpose of this book is to help compensate for the neglect that agriculture has often 
suffered in political-economic literature of the late twentieth century, and to assist what is 
fast becoming a powerful resistance movement in the agricultural realm.” (Magdoff et al., 
2000:7) 
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Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the market was not a harmonious 
and peaceful innovation. As Polanyi remarks, the establishment of a market for 
labour, especially in England’s rural civilization, “implied no less than the 
wholesale destruction of the traditional fabric of society.” (Polanyi, 1944/1957: 
77) This model of expropriation was replicated in the colonies where the natives 
were forced to sell their labour in order to make a living. “To this end their 
traditional institutions must be destroyed, and prevented from re-forming, since, 
as a rule, the individual in primitive society is not threatened by starvation 
unless the community as a whole is in a like predicament.” (Polanyi, op. cit., 
163) 
 
The process of creating a working class and centres of population concentration 
implied a demand for food which could only be supplied through technological 
innovation in the agricultural sector or by access to extra-European sources. In 
this relation it should be pointed out that feudalism in Europe had not been 
based on “a natural economy”, i.e. an economy of self-subsistence. (Wallerstein 
1974: 17) In this perspective, more than the lure of luxuries, the importance of 
staples from other regions of the world had in fact very early been a component 
of the socio-political evolution of the continent.  As noted by Immanuel 
Wallerstein, “what Western Europe needed in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries was food (more calories and a better distribution of food values) and 
fuel.” (Ibid: 42)  The drive into other regions of the world for these commodities 
contributed to expanding the territorial base of European consumption by 
constructing an international political economy in which the resource base was 
unequally consumed, that is disproportionately by Western Europe. (Ibid) 
 
The uneven access to the world’s resources was accentuated with the 
phenomena of colonialism, industrialization and imperialism that came to 
incorporate most parts of the non-European sphere. The Eurocentric 
interpretation of history of the nineteenth century is ideologically speaking quite 
instructive. While attention has been given in literature and economic analysis to 
the slum conditions existing in Western European cities, the mega famines that 
especially took place in what came to be known as the “third world” were 
largely ignored by conventional modern historians. Even the proto-Marxian 
historian Eric Hobsbawm, who published a trilogy on 19th century history, 
avoids referring to the worst famines ever in China and India although 
mentioning the Great Hunger in Ireland and the Russian famine of 1891-92. The 
paradox in world history interpretation is, as Mike Davis asks, “how do we 
explain the fact that in the very half-century when peacetime famine 
permanently disappeared from Western Europe, it increased devastatingly 
throughout much of the colonial world?” (Davis 2000: 8-9) 
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It is important to emphasize that the famines in the period 1870-1914 (especially 
those in India and China) took place within the sphere of European capitalism, 
that is after they had been incorporated in the “London-centred world economy.”  
As put by Davis: “Millions died, not outside the ‘modern world system,’ but in 
the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political 
structures. They died in the golden age of Liberal Capitalism; indeed, many 
were murdered … by the theological application of the sacred principles of 
Smith, Bentham and Mill.” Davis 2000: 9)  
 
In most cases the famines and hunger crises facing many of the extra-European 
pre-capitalist nations arose not mainly as a result of the exploitative relationship 
to the colonial metropole but because the village community and local 
production structures as those existing in India had been destroyed. This 
destruction took place not only through the intrusion of the foreign element, 
disguised as anonymous market mechanisms, but through the use of force and 
the opportune dismantlement of traditional networks of support after natural 
drought had created havoc on food production and distribution. In creating the 
preconditions for the expansion of European capitalism in the regions of Asia 
and Africa or the Americas, the “dead weight” of the protective capacity of 
traditional society had to be removed. As vividly noted by Rosa Luxemburg: 
 
A natural economy thus confronts the requirements of capitalism at every turn 
with rigid barriers. Capitalism must therefore always and everywhere fight a 
battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy that it 
encounters, whether this is slave economy, feudalism, primitive communism, 
or patriarchal peasant economy. (Luxemburg (1951) 1968: 369) 
 
 
The nexus between poverty and population growth 
In counterpoint to the Malthusian demographic explication of misery and 
starvation as the result of overpopulation, the Marxian perspective explained the 
massive social problems at the time of industrialization as a function of the 
dynamics of capitalism. The hunger and poverty that could be seen in the slums 
of industrializing Europe and the misery and famines that could be observed in 
the colonies were outgrowths of the social and economic organization of society 
and the mode of operation of the economic mechanisms. As put by Roger 
Burbach and Patricia Flynn: “Developments since Marx and Malthus wrote have 
only reinforced the view that social factors rather than scarcity are at the root of 
hunger. Over the past century the world’s food supply has in fact tended to 
increase more rapidly than its population.” (Burbach and Flynn 1980: 10) The 
fact that food production outstripped population growth didn’t however translate 
in resolving the problem of food scarcity and hunger. The position  of what may 
be called “Malthusian optimism” i.e. indifference to the politics of food - so 
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long as food production increased as fast as – or faster than population growth, 
“has been indirectly involved in millions of deaths which have resulted from 
inaction and misdirection of public policy” (Sen 1981; 1982; 1990: 35). 
Considering the problem in this manner points to a conclusion arrived at by 
Josué de Castro that it is poverty that causes population growth rather than the 
reverse. He detected a cause and effect in the relationship between poverty-
endangered population and increased fecundity or fertility as a defensive natural 
drive for survival. In other words a kind of “second movement” of the poor. The 
paradox is thus that while hunger as a social phenomenon increases the death 
rate the birth rate seems to grown even more. 
 
It is commonly noted that the undernourished classes are the most fertile; the 
ancient Romans had a word fore those who, on a starvation diet, had many 
offspring or proles –“proletarians.” There is a popular saying in Latin 
America that “the table of the poor is meagre, but fertile is the bed of misery 
….” (Castro (1952) 1977: 282) 
  
The thesis that there is a link between subsistence levels and survival has been 
confirmed by newer research (Young 1997: 3). Even conservative estimates by 
the World Health Organization maintain that a majority of most hunger-related 
deaths taking place on a daily basis and that of the some 8 million children who 
die annually from hunger do so as  the result of poverty and poverty-related 
diseases. Furthermore and in an historical perspective, the number of people in a 
state of permanent chronic hunger or malnutrition has not decreased during the 
past century and will probably rise dramatically as a consequence of the 2009-
worldwide depression. The implication is that the clock is turning   once again. 
Previously the discourse centred on food supply and food sovereignty, then the 
focus was put on food demand and food security; presently the discussion 
revolves around the questions of distribution, safety, technology, climate and 
environmental concerns (Maxwell and Slater 2004: 2) and back to the issue of 
food sovereignty involving a ban on speculation in food, reglementation  of 
agriculture production and re-regulation of commodity markets; in short a  de 
facto de-globalization of the world’s agricultural markets.  
 
The paradox that the agricultural production regime has been able to surpass 
population growth in the world capitalist system without resolving the global 
shortage of food for especially non-European countries is a paradox that requires 
the attention of critical thinking. On the one hand the productivity of capitalism 
needs to be acknowledged while, at the same time, the question as to the reason 
the global market system is unable to satisfy the biological needs of the human 
species has to be recognized as a crucial problem. In order to approach a logical 
explanation for this state of affairs, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
market is as much a political construction as a natural economic institution. 
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Refusing the classical conceptualization of the market as the outcome of the 
human propensity to barter, Polanyi emphasizes that the emergence of the 
market was not the result of the emancipation of the economic sphere from the 
dominance of the state. “On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a 
conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which 
imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends.” (Polanyi 
1944/1957: 250) 
 
Following this line of thought, it can similarly be said that the international 
division of labour based on capitalist market mechanisms was not the result of a 
natural and purely economic process but required political means and military 
force to impose and nurture it.  The concept promoted ideological acceptance for 
the organization of production specialization on a world scale that led to the 
binary division of countries into two dominant categories. The historical 
implications were that while the colonial metropoles specialized in industrial 
production, the periphery consisting of colonies or semi-colonies would 
specialize in the export of raw material or agricultural produces making them 
fatally dependent upon one or two export commodities. The resulting unequal 
terms of trade had the impact of favouring a bias for industrialization as a path 
of development and viewing agriculture as a “specialization to be transcended.” 
(McMichael 2000: 127) The unfavourable terms of trade for commodity 
producers relative to industrial exporters which were encapsulated in the concept 
of division of labour relegated the food producing sector to an inferior position 
in the capitalist economic system. The irony is of course that in our 
contemporary world, agriculture and food production have become highly 
industrialized and centralized worldwide through the global reach of what has 
been called the agro-industrial complex. This has not made export-dependent 
developing economies less vulnerable to weather, climate change or fluctuations 
in world market prices for export commodities and imports of basic food. On the 
contrary the net result has been to effectively reduce the capacity these countries  
to feed their populations. (Young 1997: 41) 
 
The point we are making is that the international division of labour is a power 
relation imposed by the strong on weaker nations in order to serve the interests 
of the leading countries. As Dietrich Rueschemeyer put it the power relation is 
camouflaged by the economic conceptualization:  
 
Yet there is no question that the conception of international trade as market 
exchange in pure form –an exchange uncontaminated by power—is 
thoroughly mistaken. International division of labour is shaped as much as 
any form of division of labour. (Rueschemeyer 1986: 179) (His emphasis) 
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In our contemporary world, historically constructed political, economic and 
social structures continue to control access and command over food, as well as 
decisions relating to food production and consumption. Within countries, 
entitlement packages are often based upon social and economic relations 
established under European colonisation. “The most critical requirement for any 
governing élite is to secure adequate food at prices which are affordable; if it 
fails to do this it loses legitimacy and risks being ousted.” An initial and vital 
constraint upon the ability to command food for its population is predicated on 
the country’s status in the international political arena, because this is where 
crucial policies influencing development --world revenues are negotiated. 
(Young 1997:36-7)  
 
Understood in this manner, it makes sense that Adam Smith’s concept of the 
“invisible hand” of the market and David Ricardo’s “law of comparative 
advantage,” as the foundation of the dominating trade theory, emerged in Britain 
at the zenith of its power. The British hegemonic international order required a 
world specialization whereby the “workshop of the world” would find markets 
for its manufactured exports and access to relatively cheap imports of raw 
materials and agricultural produce from colonies and the Americas. The pattern 
of this political economy was also implemented by competing  European  
imperialist powers in their relationship to their colonies which remained tied to 
their former masters even after decolonization (Vernon 2007: 272). Although 
modernization theory as well as economic nationalism put emphasis on 
industrialization in a “late development” strategy, the significance of agriculture 
for the establishment and functioning of the capitalist world system cannot be 
over-emphasized.  In the words of Philip McMichael: 
 
Indeed world capitalism emerged on the pedestal of colonial agricultures, 
where large-scale slave plantations prefigured the rise of the factory system. 
Not only did slavery anticipate proletarianization, but also the colonial system 
generated much of the early capital nurturing the rise of modern industry. 
(McMichael 2000: 128) 
 
From the very beginning the evolution of social relations in the agrarian 
economy (expropriation of the direct producers and their physical transfer to 
urban centres and factories) and the pattern of food production and consumption 
were primordial for the emergence of industrial capitalism in England as 
discussed above. This importance has not diminished since.  In our 
contemporary age agricultural production and food trade have become a 
component element of the process of global capital accumulation as well as the 
expression of power relations. In this context, recognition of the exploitative 
nature of the capitalist international division of labour was recognized by both 
economic nationalism and dependency theory as detrimental to development. 
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The proposed remedies to the damage of unequal exchange on non-
industrialized societies was, as far as economic nationalism was concerned, 
temporary protectionism from the competition of the world market by nurturing 
“infant industry” while on the part of the “dependistas” delinking from the 
capitalist division of labour was proposed accompanied by emphasis on a 
strategy of self-reliance which implied an agrarian sector geared to internal 
needs and food security understood as “access by all people at all times to 
enough food for an active and healthy life.” (Reutlinger 1986:1; Foster and 
Leathers 1999: 95). 
 
 
Unequal trade and power relations 
Historically, the evolution of core-periphery relations was predetermined by the 
changing needs of the industrial countries of Europe which thus affected the 
internal production structures of the colonies and semi-colonies. Another 
element which came to influence the later development of world capitalism was 
related to the fact that the modality of inclusion into the international division of 
labour had not been uniform for all extra-European countries and regions. In this 
context, it is necessary to understand that the trade pattern and composition of 
the exchanges encapsulated in the international division of labour was not a 
static relationship but prone to change and transformation. Thus the type of 
agricultural imports in European countries in the 19th century changed according 
to the industrial transformation of these societies. Imports of luxuries and spices 
were displaced by new agro-industrial commodities and other raw materials 
entering the industrializing economies of Europe for consumption by the 
emerging industrial working classes (sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, vegetable oils) or 
for covering the demand  of the production of new manufactures (cotton, timber, 
rubber and jute). These changes in the composition of trade did not however 
transform the economic and political essence of the relationship. What was most 
important for the transformation of the pattern of trade in the international 
division of labour and the political economy of world capitalism was the 
emergence of ex-colonial settler states (USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada) 
as strong agricultural producers. According to McMichael, their emergence 
came to shape world agriculture in the 20th century. Not only did their exports of 
grains and meat to the world market supplement and then compete with 
metropolitan agriculture but their produce became part of the staple diet of the 
European labour forces.  
 
The consequences of the transformation that was taking place in the USA were 
of a geo-economic and geopolitical nature. As a rapid “late-developer,” the 
United States early became a challenger to Britain whose world order had been 
based on its leadership position as an industrial and financial powerhouse. This 
evolution was related to the specificities of the socio-economic background 
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which had obtained in that former British colony. With the growth of American 
modern agriculture and industry, the United States acquired a dual comparative 
advantage giving the country the economic strength to become the leading 
player in the capitalist world economy and a major force in transforming the 
political economic structure of the colonial system. In the words of McMichael:  
 
In the twentieth century, the United States projected an alternative model of 
development based on the national integration of manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors. Whereas the British model was viewed as “outer 
directed,” the U.S. model was viewed as “inner directed.” However, obscured 
in this latter model is the powerful role of agribusiness and food power in the 
U.S.-centered global political economy of the twentieth century. (McMichael 
2000:128-29) (His emphasis)  
 
While British hegemony of the world economy was based on the “workshop of 
the world” model, which also became “the world’s banker,” the ascension of the 
United States to a dominant position in the international division of labour was 
the result of the successful synergy between what could be called agrarian 
(pre)capitalism and industrial capitalism within the evolution of one economy.  
While agriculture in most colonies or semi-colonies suffered from monoculture 
and dependence on exports for the world market, the domestic integration of 
industry and agriculture gave the United States a comparative advantage. The 
specificity of American agriculture, based on family farming in the Old 
Northwest, took place in the context of an industrialization process. The mutual 
stimulation and convergence of the two sectors created the foundations of a 
model integral development. As observed by a student of the political economy 
of this period of American history:  
 
The market for capital goods provided by the family farm system was, in part 
the cause of the mass production of farm machinery at reasonable prices that 
led to a large demand for farm machinery. Without the farm machinery, the 
food needs of industrialization probably would not have been met. But 
without the family farm system, the mass production of farm machinery 
probably would not have taken on. (Headlee 1991: 178) 
 
The American civil war which pitted the agrarian South against the industrial 
North didn’t revolve principally around the question of slavery but the question 
of autocracy versus free trade liberalism. At issue was the need for expansion of 
the internal market for Northern industries through the mechanization of 
Southern plantations while the Southern ruling strata was more interested in 
relations to the European outlets and import of cheaper manufactures. 
Consequently what evolved was the combination of the strategy of economic 
nationalism whereby protection of “infant industry” gave the American 
economy a breathing space from the competition of the advanced industrial 
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powers, while agricultural producer (tobacco, cotton, wheat) acquired access to 
external markets. The pattern of agricultural production pioneered by the United 
States was highly capital intensive and dependent on inputs such as oil, artificial 
fertilizers, hybrid seeds, machinery and pesticides. The output of agriculture 
became the basis for the growth of the meat producing sector and its 
interconnected activities such as the food industry.  
 
Seen in the perspective of the international political economy, the dialectics of 
the American late development based on an activated agricultural sector in 
correlation with the country’s industrialization process contributed to creating 
the “bread basket” model of U.S. hegemony that came to fruition following 
World War II. Contrary to the assumptions of liberalism, this evolution was not 
the result of purely economic mechanisms or market laws. Historically, the 
surge of the agro-industrial complex which played an important role in the 
trajectory of American capitalism had been nurtured by state interventionism not 
least in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s. In fact the United States 
from the beginning of its catching-up process pioneered economic nationalism 
as a strategy of shielding its industrialization process. Now in 1935, Congress 
passed legislation (an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act) to prevent 
agricultural imports in order to impose the government price-support program 
which had set domestic prices above world market levels. The protection of 
agriculture was of course in contravention to the discourse of free trade which 
the United States would consistently champion following World War II. That is 
after American food production had gained a competitive edge over the other 
producers as noted by McMichael “…this neo-mercantilist policy of import 
controls eventually produced an agro-export program of global 
significance.”(McMichael 2000:130) 
 
Whether by design or not, the result of this strategy contributed to a situation of   
agricultural overproduction thus becoming a political problem for the 
government as well as a tool of U.S. soft power. The granting of cheap food aid 
to devastated nations for gaining influence following World War II was 
beneficial for consolidating what has been called the American order of 
hegemonic stability. (Gilpin 1987:72-80) It was in the shadow of the food 
assistance program that the large American grain traders such as Cargill and 
Continental gained a foothold in foreign markets. But not only foodstuff was at 
play. The foreign aid program as encapsulated by the Marshall Plan and the 
“green revolution” also included exports of agribusiness technologies and other 
related inputs. “These two particular programs spawned modernizing 
agricultural sectors replicating the capital and energy-intensive model of 
American agriculture, from Europe through Japan to Mexico.” (McMichael: 
2000:131-32)  
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The window of opportunity for the geopolitical and geo-economic surge of the 
United States was not only the result of the weakening of the other leading 
capitalist countries during the war; it was also the capacity of American 
capitalism to mobilize internal resources to influence the course of events during 
this historical period. The strategy of protecting domestic American food 
production which had been part of the Keynesian New Deal approach under 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt continued in the post-war period. As noted 
by Harriet Friedmann: “At the end of World War II, only the United States had 
policies supporting agricultural prices through government loans which farmers 
paid off in grain.” (Friedmann 1990: 15) It was the combination of these trends 
that resulted in a relatively stable post-World War II international food regime 
that lasted until the beginning of the 1970s. The mechanism at work was the 
American farm supporting price programme which created huge surpluses held 
by the U.S. government. The impact on the international agricultural economy 
was not to be ignored. While the order of hegemonic stability reduced the 
problem of overproduction for the U.S. it had a destabilizing effect on other 
societies. The American grain stocks were used to both out-compete other 
producers and gain access to new markets in the newly independent former 
colonies. Discussing these effects on the international wheat markets, Friedmann 
writes: 
 
First, they depressed prices and created problems for all other food producers 
in the world, enabling American farmers to displace others, in for example, 
Canada, Australia and Argentina, in export markets.  But this depended on the 
second effect. The American government created new export markets in the 
Third World, in societies which were predominantly agrarian only a few 
decades ago –and in some cases still are. (Friedmann 1990: 13-14) (Her 
emphasis) 
 
The stability of the international food regime that emerged under the tutelage of 
the United States until the 1970s contained the seeds of its transformation. The 
foundation of the post-war structure of agricultural production and trade was the 
U.S. model of capital and energy intensive agribusiness. Despite its adherence to 
a discourse of free trade, the United States followed a determined course of 
protecting its domestic agriculture from foreign competitors. The mercantilism 
involved behind this strategy was consistent with the interests of rural America 
comprising both the agro-industrial complex and the constituency of family 
farmers. Simultaneously with import restrictions, the U.S. food aid programmes, 
including the Marshall Plan as well as the “green revolution,” not only 
incorporated cheap American foodstuffs, but also involved exports of 
agribusiness technologies. Not surprisingly the U.S. strategy of import 
restrictions of foreign agricultural commodities promoted a similar line of 
defence by other states who likewise came to give priority to their own domestic 
 14
agro-food sectors. This was done in a more sophisticated manner than crude 
mercantilism. In Europe, the agricultural protective strategy was not based on 
tariffs but on state support for farm prices. For other regions of the world 
adaptation to the U.S. model involved shifts in state agricultural regulations. 
Geo-economically, this meant that the American policy of state interventionism 
in nurturing agricultural overproduction was being replicated by its geopolitical 
allies.  The result as Harriet Friedmann points out was that: “… the postwar 
rules did not liberalize national agricultural policy, but created a new pattern of 
intensely national regulation.” (Friedman n.d.: 32) 
 
The acquiescence of the United States to state interventionism in the free trade 
of agricultural commodities on the part of European countries as well as of 
Japan would appear at first glance to have been contradictory to the aim of 
becoming the “bread basket” of the world. The explanation however is to be 
found in the historical context. Not only was the American government itself the 
pioneer of this strategy, but the general socio-political mood of the time fitted 
the Polanyian thesis of the “double movement” i.e. protecting society against 
unregulated market forces. (Polanyi 1944/57) In this connection, it should be 
pointed out that the point of reference for the working classes and the general 
populations of industrial capitalist societies in those years were the Great 
Depression and the Second World War. These were considered to be more than 
temporary shortcomings of the capitalist system’s mode of functioning. In 
addition, the attraction of the Soviet socio-economic model also exerted a 
certain influence on the political awareness of the times and socialism appeared 
to be on the ascendency. The acuteness of class contradictions contributed to the 
willingness of the bourgeoisie and the political elite to accept an agenda of state 
capitalism and social welfare. The resulting compromise was described as 
“passive revolution” by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Just as imperative as macro-
economic reconstruction was considered, the centrality of the state role had 
gained the ideological and political position as the “general common sense” of 
the era. The fact that reconstruction of war-devastated economies could not be 
left to the whims of market forces alone and that the New Deal regime was in 
force in the United States made Keynesianism and welfare strategies in Western 
Europe and the economic nationalism of the capitalist developmental state in 
Japan acceptable to the United States. In fact, the American implementation of 
Keynesian macro-economics may have been a determining element behind the 
emergence of the welfare state in Europe and the developmental state in Japan. 
As argued by a leading scholar of neo-realism, U.S. hegemony may actually 
have “provided the basis for the development and expansion of the European 
welfare state.” (Keohane 1984: 16-17) 
 
The tenacity of the U.S. government’s efforts to promote the interests of 
American agriculture while attempting to establish a U.S. hegemonic order on 
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the capitalist world would also collide with the undertaking of institutionalizing 
an international liberal food regime. Washington’s compact with American rural 
interests was thus dysfunctional to the proclaimed goal of its foreign geo-
economic strategy: 
 
US commitment to mercantile agricultural trade practices led to the sacrifice 
of multilateral institutions which had wide support among postwar 
governments, not only for regulating food, but also for the pursuit of the 
larger US agenda for liberal trade. (Friedmann n.d.:33) 
 
As a result, American diplomacy appeared to be incoherent as the political 
agenda was dominated by the concern of preventing encroachment on U.S. 
agricultural interests. Consequently the attempt to establish a global supply 
management and food aid board by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) under the United Nations was rejected by the United States and Britain in 
1947. The initiative of the U.S. government in 1946 to create an International 
Trade Organization (ITO) as part of the so-called Havana Treaty was not even 
submitted to the American Congress because it was in contravention to the 
protectionist trading clauses of the U.S domestic farm laws. Even the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because of American insistence, came 
to exist as a weak substitute for the stillborn ITO. Agriculture was noticeably 
excluded from GATT’s proscription of controls and export subsidies on the part 
of member countries. (Ibid.)  
 
When evaluating the food regime which the United States imposed on the 
capitalist countries after World War II, it should be recalled that its origins was 
the pattern of relations that existed in American society. The government’s farm 
support policy implied the buying of crops when the world prices were below 
those targeted by the Agricultural Department. The generalization of variants of 
this agricultural strategy created the structural foundation of the problem of 
chronic surpluses in the advanced countries. As a result, the international trade 
regime became heavily subsidized as all these countries protected their 
agricultural sector without resolving –to say the least-- the basic problem of 
over-capacity. The tax burden on the people in these societies was quite large 
while not bringing down the consumption price.  
 
As far as Third World countries were concerned, the American food aid regime 
influenced their further integration in the capitalist world market while 
alleviating to a certain extent the surplus problem of U.S. agriculture. Their 
position in the food order established through American aid was in contrast to 
that of the core industrialized countries. Based on the problems of Western 
Europe, as discussed above, these countries were able to negotiate a certain 
understanding with the United States. On the one hand, they would retain self-
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sufficiency in wheat production and dairy products while, on the other hand, the 
import controls of the European Community would be relinquished with regard 
to American maize and soya as well as other animal feedstuffs. Consequently 
the loss of the European market for U.S. wheat export was made up by the 
import of feedstuffs to the growing meat and dairy sectors of European 
agriculture. While political restrictions were put on the import of certain 
agricultural commodities, Europe’s shortage of capital and the openness to 
capital investment by American corporations contributed to the integration of 
European and U.S. agro-food sectors through industrial inputs and processing. 
(Friedmann, n.d.: 36)  The Bretton Woods agreement had established what has 
been called dollar hegemony and American capital in all forms was welcome 
throughout the entire capitalist world and beyond. 
 
Food aid under the Marshall Plan was meant to speed the reconstruction of these 
economies and pacify the short-term basic consumer needs of Europeans. The 
concern for a re-emergence of these economies called forth the benevolent side 
of U.S. hegemony. While the American government seeked to project U.S. 
interests in Europe it had to manage certain constraints due to socio-economic 
and political conditions existing in European societies and Japan. In contrast, 
American food aid to the Third World took place in a different context and had 
different outcomes in the transformation of these societies. As Harriet 
Friedmann put it: “It undermined local agriculture, creating new proletarians 
dependent on commercial food, and new nations dependent on imports.” 
(Friedmann 1990:17)   
 
Being in a situation of dependency to the core capitalist nations, the countries of 
the periphery were placed in a predicament related to the legacy of 
decolonization, the emergence of the hegemony of the United States and the 
international food order it was in the process of establishing. Many of the 
regimes in the Third World were ideologically and politically motivated by class 
interests. The lopsidedness and weakness of their economies influenced the 
decision-making of the governments following the growth model of 
modernization. Thus while U.S. food aid alleviated the American chronic 
surplus problem, it eased Third World governments’ foreign exchange 
difficulties. The costs of subsidizing a national food production, as had been 
done in the European case, would have been prohibitive besides also involving 
higher consumer prices as well. Commercial food imports at world market 
prices would have been a burden on the foreign currency reserves and 
constrained investment possibilities as well as import of finished goods and 
investment goods. Given that most regimes were eager to follow a path of 
industrialization, they opted for cheap food policies in order to hold wage levels 
down. Through special currency arrangements, the subsidized U.S. food exports 
made it possible for the aid recipients to establish funds in their local currencies 
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to pay for these American imports. These funds were at the disposal of the U.S. 
who could then be used them to implement American strategic and military 
objectives in these societies. 
 
Consequently, the limitations of American wheat exports to Europe were partly 
offset by a surge of exports to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As 
practically non-existent importers of wheat, these countries’ position rose from 
absorbing almost half of the world imports in 1971 to their peak in 1978, when 
their purchases accounted for about 78 percent of U.S. wheat exports. 
(Friedmann 1990:29) The consequences for the internal societal development of 
the peripheral formations were that the domestic producers of cereals could not 
compete with the imported wheat. These societies experienced a demographic 
migration from rural areas to urban centres as many lost whatever means of 
subsistence encompassed in the agrarian economy. Seen in this manner, the 
wheat import contributed to putting a large segment of the population in the 
twilight zone of urban dwellers in the social categories of working class or 
lumpenproletariat in the city slums. Implicitly, U.S. food aid thus became a 
vehicle of proletarianization. (Friedmann 1990:21) 
 
The agricultural sector in many cases came to be characterized by rural lopsided 
underdevelopment and dependence on food imports while being transformed to 
export orientation and specialization for world market. This took place in 
conjunction with the development of large agribusiness4 corporations in the 
developed capitalist world, first and foremost in the United States. Thus parallel 
to the American state’s domestic agricultural policies and the establishment of 
an international food regime, the evolution of the private U.S. agro-sector on the 
world scene contributed to the transformation of the international trading 
regime. Soon after World War II, the organization of food production along 
lines similar to the industrial sector was accompanied by the modernization of 
agriculture and the introduction of scientific externalities. It was especially since 
the mid-1960s that a new relationship between agribusiness of the advanced 
countries and the agrarian sectors of Third World societies took shape. The 
reliance of modern agriculture upon research and development of various inputs 
such as herbicides, fungicides, insecticides and synthetic fertilizers gave the 
transnationals a comparative advantage because of their petrochemical divisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4   The concept originated in the 1950s in the United States and is accredited to Ray 
Goldberg (a professor of business and agriculture at the Harvard Business School) who is 
considered to be the real father of “agribusiness.” Together with John H. Davis the term 
was used to analyze the U.S. integrated food system. (Goldberg and Davis 1957) 
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From food overproduction to scarcity 
Until the 1960s and 1970s, the diffusion of the new inputs and methods of 
cultivation was principally carried out in the advanced countries. However, with 
the saturation of these markets, the agro-transnationals looked for markets in 
Third World countries. Coincidentally with this a neo-Malthusian discourse re-
emerged in the attempt to frame the problem of underdevelopment. Another 
factor influencing the general mood was the serious crop failures in 1972-73, 
when world food production actually fell for the first time in many years. In 
addition, the grain purchases by the Soviet Union transformed the world market 
from one of over-abundance to that of scarcity. The spectacles of famine in 
Ethiopia, the African Sahel and Bangladesh morphed the “food crisis” into a 
“population bomb” concern.  The explanation that over-population was the 
cause of hunger and malnutrition came to dominate within political institutions 
such as the U.S. and other governments in the advanced capitalist nations, 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, private foundations 
such as the Rockefeller Foundation, and last but not least the multinational 
corporations. (Burbach and Flynn 1980: 11)  A two-pronged strategy was 
promoted for dealing with the food scarcity problem: l) a worldwide campaign 
to control population growth and 2) the modernization of the pre-modern 
agricultural sectors of Third World nations “in the mold of the capitalist world’s 
most efficient and productive system: namely, U.S. agribusiness.” (Burbach and 
Flynn 1980: 12)  
 
Related to this it must not be forgotten that there are two striking features in the 
present food crisis. 1) A rapidly increasing number of people who are 
chronically hungry and malnourished and 2) a continued rising dependence on 
food imports (Platteau 1990: 279). Where the first is concerned with food 
security the second is related to food self-sufficiency. The centrality of food is 
not only illuminated by the fact that more than 2 billion people are directly 
employed in food and agricultural production but also by emphasizing that in 
2009 more than one billion people, the hungry and undernourished, are left to 
the mercy of markets and donors. In this way, proximate variables like war, 
drought, flooding, late rains, crop failures related to global warming and climate 
change do occasionally affect and trigger hunger or famine but  “these are only 
effective as triggers in specific ‘spaces of vulnerability’ …. That has emerged 
consequent upon historical created processes and ideologies which dictate 
access to power, in its many manifestations, at the international, national and 
local levels.” (Young 1997: 4) 
 
Most Third World governments, eager to modernize their agriculture, also 
encouraged and financed the use of imported fertilizers, pesticides and hybrid 
seeds, thereby creating a dependence on agribusiness transnationals. Another 
factor influencing technological diffusion in the agrarian sector of Third World 
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nations was the growth of contract farming which involved the agreement of 
large and middle-sized farmers to conditions set by large food-processing 
corporations based in the core nations. A further form of incursion has been the 
relation of international fast food restaurant chains to cattle ranchers making 
them produce beef according to their instructions. The export of beef is based on 
a land intensive form of production which withdraws good agricultural lands 
from the available domestic supply. As James M. Cypher and James L. Dietz put 
it in their analysis of the activities of agribusiness in Third World nations, “such 
farming operations can contribute to deforestation, land degradation, and 
environmental pollution, ranging from soil erosion to global warming.” (Cypher 
and Dietz 2004: 356) 
 
Last but not least the specialization of some agrarian exporting economies in 
catering to the high income consumption markets of the countries of the 
Northern Hemisphere with fresh foods was made possible by the revolution in 
the transport industry.  
                                                                                                                                                      
The modernization of the means of transport, including cooling systems, which 
are energy intensive (air shipment) makes it possible to find year-round tropical 
products and traditional luxury fruits in the supermarkets of advanced 
industrialized countries. The concept “strawberry imperialism”5  describes the 
fact that seasonal “exotic” fruit or flowers can be flown long distances to 
markets in North America, Europe and Japan. This implies that long and 
sophisticated supply chains concentrated in a few powerful transnational food 
manufacturers control production and marketing on a global scale. 
Concentration of power over the food system and contractual relationships 
“turns the farmer into a contractor, providing the labour and often some capital, 
but never owning the product as it moves through the supply chain.” (Lang 
2004: 26) Another consequence of the industrialization and monopolization of 
food production and long supply chains is that this   agricultural pattern creates 
enormous amounts of toxic waste which chokes wetlands, rivers and oceans and 
leads to the destruction of the world’s soils and forests (Hossay 2006: 144-45) 
while giving rise to the environmental problem of what has been called  ‘food 
miles’.6 
 
 
                                                          
5  The term was coined by Ernest Feder in an analysis of the dependency of Mexican 
agriculture on the United States. (Feder 1977) 
6  As discussed by McMichael (2009: 139) who points to our ability to continue to transport 
and suggests that a coherent political economy and political ecology perspective is 
necessary in order to understand the dimensions of the current food crisis. 
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Concluding remarks 
Food production has become an important component of the world economy. 
Besides   accounting for more than 10 percent of international commerce, 
agriculture has a significant multiplying effect on manufacturing industries, 
petro-chemical industry and transport. Food being a life supporting necessity, 
treating it as a commodity in agricultural global trade cannot but have socio-
economic and political consequences for both the producers and the consumers. 
This applies especially to the half of humankind making up the three billion 
Third World peasants. The “great transformation” of agrarian societies of the 
periphery has been dramatic and is still an ongoing process. As Richard J. 
Barnet and John Cavanagh writing on this problem put it: 
 
In the warm, poor regions where the majority of the world’s population lives, 
most of the arable land has been used for thousands of years for subsistence 
farming.  But as the forces of globalization close in, acreage once used by 
people to raise food for themselves and their families has become too 
valuable to remain outside the money economy. (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994: 
210) 
 
The process behind the dispossession and uprooting of these farmers is a dark 
chapter of colonialism and contemporary capitalism is outside the purview of 
modernization theory or neoliberalism that instead focus on free trade as the 
path to development. While world public opinion is at times made aware of 
acute short-term crises like famines, long-term structural food deficiency is not 
given the same attention as it would bring awareness of the malfunctioning of 
the world economy. The inclusion of what Franz Fanon called “The Wretched of 
the Earth” in the world capitalist system is a process which in the best of cases 
would demand no less than a herculean socio-economic and political mutation. 
The reason for this assumption is related to the fact that the modus operandi of 
the system is welded to the specific modality behind the creation and division of 
the global economic surplus. Under “real existing capitalism” the dilemma is 
constantly produced and reproduced. From a perspective based on international 
political economy, food insecurity for a substantial part of the population of the 
world and the overproduction of foodstuffs are in fact component parts of the 
capital formation and accumulation on a world scale. Consequently, lack of 
production is rarely the principal reason for hunger but rather a function of 
institutional, organizational, and a blind faith in the market. In the United States 
for example, regardless of agricultural overproduction, 35 million people 
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture lived in food-insecure 
households in 2006. In poor countries, large stocks of wasted and misallocated 
food can also be found in the midst of widespread and persistent hunger as has 
been reported in the case Indian society. (Magdoff 2008: 1-2) It also has to be 
taken into consideration that a lot of hypocrisy exists in the current debate. For 
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instance, “as on every other day, on September 11, 2001, when terrorists 
murdered 2.973 people in the United States, almost twelve times that number, an 
estimated 35,000, were killed by hunger around the world.” (Vernon 2007:1) 
 
The new agrarian question facing contemporary capitalism revolves around the 
consequences of the “coexistence” of highly productive agriculture and the 
survival and reproduction of chronic hunger. Based on the interests of the most 
productive countries who have modernized agricultural sectors, international 
financial institutions and the World Trade Organization have endeavoured to 
have the member countries submit to the rules of competition in an open and 
deregulated global market. As Martin Khor points out the countries were 
required to dismantle protective measures against external exports“… the longer 
term reason for the decline of agriculture in many developing countries, in most 
cases (is) due to the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World 
Bank.” (Khor 1968: 1) The upshot of the general principle of competition for 
agricultural produces and foodstuffs in essence means acceptance of the 
elimination of billions of non-competitive producers in the periphery within a 
record historical limited time. The conventional argument of modernization 
theory has always been that the model of economic and social development of 
Europe represented the example to be emulated by developing countries. While 
the genesis and development of industrial capitalism could absorb the population 
shift to urban centres, this process spread over nearly two centuries. It is 
questionable whether modern technologies which are not labour intensive could, 
in the best of conditions, have a similar effect. In order to be competitive on the 
world market, newly industrializing countries would need to import modern 
technologies. Another factor which is not open to Third World nations as was 
the case for Europe is the massive emigration of its surplus population to the 
Americas and elsewhere in the colonial empires. Samir Amin (2003) who draws 
our attention to divergence of situations between historical capitalism in the 
European mould and the prevailing conditions in most of the Third World makes 
the point that the dispossessed farmers are condemned to become dwellers in the 
slums of urban centres.  
 
The way out of the conundrum could perhaps be found in the application of a 
variant of a delinking strategy at the national, regional and global levels.7 
Consequently at the national level macro policies of protecting peasant food 
production from the unequal competition of modernized farmers and 
agribusiness corporations would contribute to establish an affordable food price 
level that is disconnected from world market prices.  
 
                                                          
7   This section is inspired and borrows from the reflections by Samir Amin (2003: 4-5). 
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Similarly, another concern should be giving priority to a socially-balanced 
expansion of the internal market instead of prioritizing export-oriented 
production. Attention would thus be to nurture and ensure national food security 
and thus achieving an indispensable margin of autonomy and negotiating 
capacity. To be effective in the present world economy, international agreements 
and policies at regional and global levels could help move away from the 
doctrinaire principles of the WTO on free trade and replacing them with 
applicable and specific solutions for different areas, specific issues and concrete 
historical and social conditions. 
 
The above reflections might seem less utopian than the conventional thinking on 
the world food crisis would indicate. A continuation of “business as usual” is 
bound to reach its limit. According Martin Khor, the global rise of food prices 
and shortages in some countries in the past few years is changing assumptions 
and expectations: 
 
Because of this new situation, the paradigm of “food security” has shifted 
back to the traditional concept of greater self-sufficiency, instead of 
prioritizing the option of relying on cheaper imports. (Khor 2008: 1) 
 
Although emergencies might require external food supplies to affected areas, 
Khor maintains that a long-term solution “must include increased local food 
production in developing countries. This raises the question of what constitute 
the barriers to local food production and how to remove these barriers.” (Khor 
2008: 1) In this connection, it would be naïve to believe that the task of 
providing for an expanding population can automatically be implemented by 
non-capitalist societies. Amiya Kumar Bagchi reminds us that antisystemic 
regimes following liberation struggles or revolutions often experienced famines. 
These societies inherited low levels of productivity putting them at risk between 
starvation and survival. Because of the antagonism of the leading capitalist 
nations they were reluctant to reveal their weaknesses to the world assuming that 
such revelations would be used against them. Furthermore, local bureaucratic 
mentality also played a role in famine politics. Referring to Devereux (2000) 
and Drèze and Sen (1990a), (1990b), (1991) Bagchi writes that during the 
famines in the Ukraine in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and in the case of the 
Chinese famine of 1958-1961, local party officials had been reluctant to inform 
the higher leadership that agricultural production was not going according to the 
centrally planned targets. (Bagchi 2005: 315)   
 
With the reintegration of most antisystemic countries in the  international 
division of labour, there is a certain irony in the fact that many of what are 
called “emerging markets” such as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China) have in the past followed strategies of late development by implementing 
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self-reliance or import-substitution in their relationship to the capitalist world 
market. Now their re-emergence in the structure of international trade has 
contributed to the rise of commodity prices including food!  
 
When considering the scourge of hunger holistically, one conclusion is 
inescapable. Perhaps the persistence or return of/to history of the agrarian 
question may contain the seeds of the coming clash of civilization within global 
capitalism. On the one side, the non-sustainability of modern agriculture in 
terms of ecological costs and input requirements, not least water resource, is 
becoming apparent. Food security is not linked only to the environment and 
water but also health, nutrition and energy like fossil fuels nor is the 
consumption pattern created by the efficient food industry to be ignored: 
malnutrition and obesity are affecting large sections of the populations of the 
world and increasing the urgency of resolving the problems of social justice, 
inequalities and the growing gap between North and South. On the other side, 
we see the emergence of new socio-economic and political contradictions in 
agrarian societies. This confrontation concerns the fate of half of humankind, i.e. 
three billion people and involves food sovereignty movements among farmers, 
organic farmers, food riots and new social resistance against un-sustainable and 
un-regulated neo-liberalist restructuring, GM food and contract-based TNC food 
manufacturing. The choice at hand here is political: either continuation of the 
process of capital accumulation which includes exclusion, marginalization, 
(lumpen) proletarization of the peasantry, commodification of food production  
or a rupture with the logic of capitalism which would entail inclusion, self-
reliance, delinking and decommodification of life- supporting food production. 
Each alternative contains a class struggle perspective that is certain to shape the 
future configuration of “real existing capitalism.” 
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